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NOTES & COMMENTS
MIXED MOTIVES MIX-UP:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT EVADES
THE DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
IN DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the context of Title VII employment discrimination, two primary
analytical frameworks for the treatment of litigation have emerged: pretext' and
mixed motives. Although these categories are recognized as distinct in most
circuits,3 the full Ninth Circuit declared that no such difference exists in Costa v.
4
Desert Palace, Incorporated.
However, the Ninth Circuit's approach to Title VII
litigation in this case omits a crucial stage of the analysis, making its conclusion
questionable when examined in relation to Supreme Court precedent. 5 If
permitted to stand, the Costa analysis could shift the balance of Title VII litigation
and put employers at the mercy of litigation with questionable merits. 6 The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit,7 and in deciding the
case should affirm the distinction between cases and provide guidance for the
analysis of disparate treatment cases.
One reason for the Ninth Circuit's approach is apparently an effort to
streamline Title VII litigation and avoid some of the confusion that has arisen in

1. The pretext framework is characterized generally by three steps: (1) the plaintiff has the burden
of proving a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) upon the showing of a prima facie case, the
employer must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, (3) upon the
satisfaction of the employers' burden of production, the plaintiff must prove that the reason proffered
by the employer is pretextual. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981).
2. The mixed motives analysis is invoked when there is sufficient evidence to find that the adverse
employment decision was motivated by two or more criteria, at least one of which is permissible. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J., concurring).
3. See e.g. Watson v. S. E. Penn. Trans. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2000); Bickerstaff v. Vassar
College, 196 F.3d 435, 445 (2d Cir. 1999).
4. 299 F.3d 838, 854-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
5. Infra pt. IV(B) (concluding that the Ninth Circuit bypassed a crucial aspect of Supreme Court
precedent).
6. Infra text accompanying nn. 247-52.
7. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003).
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disparate treatment cases.8 Whether a case is classified as pretext or mixed
motives can be crucial to the outcome, and parties have been willing to litigate
extensively to obtain a favorable classification. 9 The distinction is important to the
parties because labeling a case as pretext or mixed motives carries important
implications for the parties' burdens of persuasion. 0 Under pretext analysis, the
burden of proving that an employment decision was made based upon a protected
trait rests at all times upon the plaintiff;11 however, mixed motives analysis is more
forgiving for the plaintiff.1 2 Under mixed motives analysis, if the plaintiff proves
that the trait was a motivating factor in the employment decision-although
perhaps not the sole reason-the defendant then has the burden of proving that
the same decision would have been made absent any discriminatory intent. 3
The key to differentiating between pretext cases and mixed motives cases
has been the direct evidence requirement. 4 Under the direct evidence
requirement, a mixed motives case is born when the plaintiff is able to prove by
direct evidence that an improper characteristic was a motivating factor in the
adverse action taken by the employer. 5 In the absence of such direct evidence,
the case proceeds under the pretext framework

6

A product of Justice

O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,7 the direct
evidence requirement has found its way into Title VII jurisprudence in almost

every circuit.' 8
Exactly what Justice O'Connor meant by direct evidence has generated

considerable debate, and there have been conflicting interpretations of the
requirement among lower courts. 9 In Costa, the Ninth Circuit has added yet
another analysis to the mix by abolishing the direct evidence requirement

8. See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motives Cases in Employment DiscriminationLaw Revisited: A Brief
Updated View of the Swamp, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 651, 651 (2000) (characterizing the state of Title VII
litigation as a swamp).
9. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Student Author, Despite the Smoke, There Is no Gun: Direct
Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law after Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46
Stan. L. Rev. 959, 978-80 (1994).
10. Infra text accompanying nn. 11-13.
11. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-58.
12. Infran. 51.
13. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality). In addition to the differing burdens of
proof, the pretext and mixed motives analyses differ according to the point at which liability is
established. This is discussed further at infra text accompanying notes 66-68.
14. Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999).
15. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. See Fernandes,199 F.3d at 580.
17. 490 U.S.228.
18. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 866 (Gould, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464,
467 (1st Cir. 1990); Ostrowski v. A. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992); Starceski v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1995); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th
Cir. 1995); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Assn., 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 1991); Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons, Inc., 105 F.3d 343, 347
(7th Cir. 1997); Shleiniger v. Des Moines Water Works, 925 F.2d 1100, 1101 (8th Cir. 1991); Heim v.
Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1547 (10th Cir. 1993); E.E.O.C. v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923 (11th
Cir. 1990)).
19. See Belton, supra n. 8, at 662-63.
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altogether. 20 The Ninth Circuit's proposed framework for Title VII litigation
makes the mixed motives burden shift available to practically any plaintiff who is
able to create an inference that a protected trait was a motivating factor, as
21
opposed to requiring direct proof.
This note contends that Costa contravenes Supreme Court precedent and
wrongly states the proper analysis for Title VII litigation. Section II details the
development of Title VII analysis, and Section III recounts the facts of the Costa
case. Section IV demonstrates that, according to the Supreme Court's instructions
for treatment of plurality decisions, the direct evidence requirement is part of the
binding precedent of Price Waterhouse. Section V contends that collapsing the
pretext/mixed motives distinction will effectively override the McDonnell Douglas
v. Green22 pretext framework in almost every case, just as the Costa dissent
warns. 23 Section VI proposes that confusion and inconsistencies among the lower
courts would best be mitigated by developing a uniform definition of direct
evidence rather than abolishing the requirement altogether. The last section also
proposes a uniform definition of direct evidence that is consistent with Justice
O'Connor's opinion and the purposes of civil rights legislation.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII LITIGATION

24

Congress' ratification of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its subsequent
enactment made it illegal for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 25 The purpose of the Act was to
eliminate discriminatory employment practices. 6
In 1973, the Supreme Court addressed the fact that discriminatory intent is
27
sometimes difficult to prove.
In McDonnell Douglas, the unanimous Court
permitted a plaintiff to prove intent through pretext analysis.28 Under this
analysis, the plaintiff can build a presumption of unlawful discrimination by ruling

20. Costa, 299 F.3d at 853.
21. See id. at 853-54.
22. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
23. Costa, 299 F.3d at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting).
24. It should be noted that several courts have adopted the view that the same analytical framework
applies to litigation arising under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and other anti-discrimination legislation. See e.g. Serapion
v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1997). Whether this view is accurate has not been expressly
determined by the Supreme Court; however, it has been adopted arguendo at least once. See Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). Therefore, this note may use developments
from caselaw involving ADEA and other anti-discrimination statutes to illustrate or explain Title VII
litigation.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (as enacted by Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255
(1964)).
26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
27. See Lewis v. Univ. of Pitt., 725 F.2d 910, 923 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that pretext analysis was
constructed because "it often will be difficult for the plaintiff to obtain direct evidence of the
employer's motive.").
28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
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out the most common lawful reasons for adverse employment action.2 9 This
presumption is created when the plaintiff builds a prima facie case of
discrimination. 0 Once the presumption is created, the employer can rebut it by
providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
decision." Finally, if the presumption has been rebutted, the plaintiff is given an
opportunity to discredit the proffered nondiscriminatory reason by proving that it
is pretextual-in other words, that the proffered reason was not the true reason
for the employment decision.32
The Supreme Court clarified pretext analysis in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.33 The Court held that the burden placed upon the

defendant by the pretext presumption was merely a burden of production, and the
defendant could not be obligated to prove its posited motivation by a
preponderance of the evidence. 34 The defendant's reason must raise "a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff,"35 and once such a
requirement is met "the prima facie case is rebutted. 3 6 The Court noted, "[t]he
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
37
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.
Since Burdine, the Supreme Court has admonished that the focus of the
pretext case should not be on a mechanical operation of the prima facie case, but
instead on the ultimate question of "discrimination vel non."38 Once the
defendant's burden of production has been met, the presumption is eliminated
and the plaintiff must then prove the ultimate question of discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.39 Justice Powell, in Burdine, noted that the
plaintiff could prevail at this stage "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by
4
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
When a plaintiff proceeds under the latter method, the finder of fact may treat the
erroneousness of the defendant's proffered reason as probative on the issue of
intentional discrimination; 4 1 however, successfully demonstrating that the
29. Burdine,450 U.S. at 253-54.
30. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court noted that the formula is not a rigid structure,
but instead must be varied according to the facts of the case. Id. at 802 n. 13. In McDonnell Douglas,
the prima facie case was built by showing that (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2)
the plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer sought applicants, (3) the
plaintiff was rejected for the job, and (4) after the rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons with plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802.
31. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
32. Id. at 804.
33. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
34. /d. at 256-58.
35. Id. at 254.
36. Id. at 255.
37. Id. at 253.
38. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Govs. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
39. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
40. Id. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 804-05).
41. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ("Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is
simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination.").
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employer's reason is false does not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of
law.42 In other words, the prima facie case coupled with demonstration of the
tendered reason's falsity43permits the fact finder to infer intentional discrimination
but does not mandate it.
One of the heavily anchored principles running throughout the Supreme
Court's pretext analysis jurisprudence is that the plaintiff at all times bears the
burden of proving discrimination." To this end, a plaintiff may use circumstantial
evidence to create inferences that a protected trait was a reason for the
employment decision.4' However, proving that the trait was the reason for a
decision requires proof of the employer's state of mind, a burden that can be
difficult to satisfy. 6 To some,
the requirement that plaintiff prove subjective
47

intent is simply too onerous.

The mixed motives analysis sprouted up through the lower courts during the
1980s as trial courts struggled with the issue of causation when both legitimate and
illegitimate factors were considered in an employment decision. 8 In these mixed
motives cases, when the plaintiff was able to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that an illegitimate factor was considered in the employment decision,
some lower courts began permitting a burden shift to the defendant whereby the
defendant was required to prove that the adverse employment decision would
have resulted even if the illegitimate factor had not been considered. 49 This claim
is known as the "same decision" defense. 0 This analysis is considered plaintifffriendly compared to pretext analysis.5 ' The Supreme Court attempted to tackle
the burden shifting issue in 1989 in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.

42. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,511 (1993).
43. Supra nn. 38-39 and accompanying text.
44. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); Hicks,
509 U.S. at 507; Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
45. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n. 3.
46. For a brief discussion of the difficulties involved in proving subjective intent, see William R.
Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of "PretextPlus," and the EscalatingSubordination of Federal
Employment DiscriminationLaw to Employers at Will: Lessons from McKinnon and Hicks, 30 Ga. L.
Rev. 305, 351 n. 232 (1996).
47. See e.g. Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of CircumstantialProof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 Berkeley J.
Empl. & Lab. L. 183, 185 (1997) ("The Court has, in effect, placed upon plaintiffs in Title VII actions
the burden of proving discrimination beyond any doubt.").
48. See e.g. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985).
49. Two lines of analysis developed in courts that permitted burden shifting. One analytical method
permitted the defendant to avoid all liability by successfully asserting the same decision defense.
Under the other method, liability attached when the plaintiff proved that the illegitimate factor
motivated the employment decision, but the employer who successfully proved the same decision
defense limited the damages to which plaintiff was entitled. Compare Blalock, 775 F.2d at 713 ("Metal
Trades may avoid all liability by showing that even had Blalock maintained his initial religious views,
his work performance was so intolerable to Metals Trades that he still would have been discharged.")
with Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1985) ("A defendant's showing that the plaintiff
would not have gotten the job anyway does not extinguish liability. It simply excludes the remedy of
retroactive promotion or reinstatement.").
50. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856.
51. See Benjamin C. Mizer, Student Author, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual
Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 234, 242 (2001); Christopher Y. Chen, Student Author,
Rethinking the Direct Evidence Requirement: A Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motives
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In Price Waterhouse, the accounting firm declined to extend partnership
status to Ann Hopkins. 3 Feedback from partners revealed that Hopkins'
personality, described as brusque 4 had adversely affected her partnership
candidacy.5 However, some comments indicated that partners' evaluations of her
work had been colored by her gender, and that they "reacted negatively to [her]
personality because she was a woman. '56 Hopkins brought suit under Title VII
and prevailed at the trial level.5 ' Although the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the outcome, the court pronounced that successful
implementation of the same decision defense shields the employer from all
liability in a Title VII case. 58 Arguing before the Supreme Court, Hopkins
advanced two primary contentions: (1) the employer can be made to bear the
burden of proving the same decision defense in mixed motives cases, and (2)
successful use of the same decision defense does not shield the employer from
liability, but instead merely limits the remedies to which plaintiff is entitled.5 9
Price Waterhouse was a plurality opinion, with four Justices joining in the
opinion of the Court, three dissenting, and two separately concurring in the
judgment. 60 The plurality and separately concurring Justices White and O'Connor
agreed with Hopkins that the employer could be made to bear the burden of
proving the same decision defense in a mixed motives case.61 However, Justice
O'Connor alone found that burden shifting could take place only in cases where
the plaintiff had direct evidence of illegal discrimination. 62 On her second legal
assertion, Hopkins did not prevail, as the plurality and concurring Justices
established that the successful use
of the same decision defense completely
6
1
liability.
of
employer
the
absolved
In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 64 Congress took aim at Supreme
Court decisions that were perceived as weakening the employment protections
Congress had enacted in the 1964 Act.65 Congress had the Price Waterhouse

DiscriminationClaims, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 907 (2001).
52. 490 U.S. 228 (plurality).
53. Id. at 233.
54. Id. at 234.
55. Id. at 234-35.
56. Id. at 235.
57. 490 U.S. at 236-37.
58. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Blalock, 775 F.2d at
712).
59. Id. at 238.
60. 490 U.S. 228 (plurality); id.at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id.at 258 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61. 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality); id.at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id.at 261 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
62. Id. at 276 ("In my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the
defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion
was a substantial factor in the decision.").
63. Id. at 242 (plurality); id.
at 261 n. * (White, J., concurring); id.(O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1994).
65. Corbett, supra n. 46, at 340.
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decision in its sights when it crafted Section 107 of the 1991 Act. 66 This section
effectively adopted Ann Hopkins' contention that liability for a Title VII violation
was established at the time plaintiff proved that the protected trait was a factor in
the employment decision 67 and that successful use of the same decision defense
merely limits the remedies available to plaintiff rather than absolving defendant
completely. 68 Whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had any effect on the direct
evidence requirement is unclear. 69 The Act did not specifically address whether

direct evidence is the gateway into mixed motives analysis, and the legislative
history of the Act yields no determinative clues.7 °
The contemporary analytical structure for Title VII cases embraces the two

types of disparate treatment actions, pretext and mixed motives, as employing
distinct analytical frameworks.71 Under this view, direct evidence, whatever it may
be, is the floodgate that determines whether plaintiffs can avail themselves of the
calmer waters of mixed motives. 72 The Ninth Circuit abolished this distinction in
Costa,73 and its holding blew open the floodgate.
III.

COSTA V. DESERTPALACE, INC.

Caesars Palace, a Las Vegas casino and hotel, employed Catharina Costa in
its warehouse. 74 Her job duties entailed operating forklifts and pallet jacks to pull

66. Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report
Agenda, 31 U. Rich. L. Rev. 757, 771-72 (1997).
67. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) (enacted as 42
U.S.C. 2000e-2(m)) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.").
68. The enactment states in pertinent part:
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 703(m) and a
respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the courtmay grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and
attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of
a claim under section 703(m); and
shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991) (enacted as 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
69. Infra n. 70.
70. For thoughtful treatment of the issue of whether Congressional intent regarding the direct
evidence requirement can be deduced from the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see
Mizer, supra note 51, at 256-60. Additional discussion is available at Belton, supra note 8, at 661
("[T]he legislative history [of the Civil Rights Act of 1991] is singularly uninstructive on the substantive
standard to be applied in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases."). Because no meaningful
and conclusive intent can be gleaned from the legislative history of the 1991 Act, its effect on the direct
evidence requirement is outside the scope of this note. A review of the literature on the subject reveals
that some commentators have proven themselves adept at divining supportive evidence from
Congressional silence. This note seeks to avoid such practice.
71. See e.g. Fernandes,199 F.3d at 579-80.
72. See e.g. id. at 580.
73. Costa, 299 F.3d at 857.
74. Id. at 844.
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drink orders for the hotel, and she was the only female in this job.75 Costa's job
performance was satisfactory; however, she encountered friction with co-workers
and management. 76 Costa was reprimanded, denied opportunities to work
overtime, and eventually terminated. 7 She attributed the adverse employment
decisions to gender discrimination.78
Costa's difficulties at work came to a head as a result of an altercation with
another worker.79 The other worker, upset over a report he believed she made
about him, confronted Costa, and a physical altercation ensued in which Costa was
bruised. 0 After investigation, Caesars disciplined both employees.81 Costa,
having already amassed a disciplinary record that included suspensions, was
terminated.8 ' The other employee, having served twenty-five years without any
prior suspensions, was suspended for five days.83
Costa brought suit in the District of Nevada, contending that she suffered
from disparate working conditions and was disciplined differently because of her
gender.84 At trial, Costa presented no evidence that directly linked her gender to
any disciplinary decision by Caesars." However, the presiding judge noted that,
from the evidence presented, a reasonable mind could infer that Costa's gender
was a motivating factor in Caesars' conduct toward her.86 The court gave the jury
a mixed motives instruction.87 After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict that
gender was a motivating factor in Caesars' treatment of Costa and that Caesars
had failed to prove that the outcome would have been the same had gender not
been taken into account. 88
Caesars appealed its adverse ruling, contending that the trial court erred in
giving the jury a mixed motives instruction.89 Caesars asserted that the mixed
motives instruction should not have been given because Costa failed to present
direct evidence of discrimination. 90 A panel of the Ninth Circuit agreed with
Caesars, ruling that the direct evidence requirement was a prerequisite for the

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 844-45.
Costa, 299 F.3d at 846.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. ld. at 845-46.
83. Costa v. Desert Palace,Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. Costa, 299 F.3d at 846.
85. There was no evidence that directly showed a nexus between an adverse employment decision
and Costa's gender. For instance, the Ninth Circuit panel noted that in her trial testimony, Costa
stated that when she approached management about the reason a male coworker received a
disproportionately large number of the overtime hours she was told that it was because he was a man
and had a family to support. However, on cross-examination she retracted that statement and
admitted that the supervisor's statement was gender neutral. Desert Palace,268 F.3d at 888.
86. Costa, 299 F.3d at 846.
87. Id. at 858.
88. Id. at 862-63.
89. Id. at 844.
90. Id.
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mixed motives instruction.9' The Ninth Circuit permitted rehearing en banc92 and
reversed the panel's decision. 93
By a five to four split, the en banc majority held that there is no direct
evidence requirement for the mixed motives instruction, reasoning that the
pretext and mixed motives cases are not exclusive types of Title VII actions. 94 In
reaching its conclusion, the majority disregarded what it characterized as Justice
O'Connor's "passing reference" to direct evidence in Price Waterhouse.9' The
Court also noted the disjointed state of mixed motives litigation among the
circuits:
The resulting jurisprudence has been a quagmire that defies characterization despite
the valiant efforts of various courts and commentators. Within circuits, and often
within opinions, different approaches are conflated, mixing burden of persuasion
with evidentiary standards, confusing burden of ultimate persuasion with the burden
to establish an affirmative
defense, and declining to acknowledge the role of
96
circumstantial evidence.
The Court suggested that the direct evidence requirement, as implemented in
other circuits, was simply used to substitute the courts' judgment for that of the
jury.97
The Ninth Circuit looked to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and concluded that
Congress did not intend to establish a different allocation of evidentiary burden in
single motive and mixed motives actions.9" Instead, the Court held, the plaintiff
was merely required to prove that the protected trait was a motivating factor in
the employment decision. 99
The framework adopted by the Ninth Circuit makes no differentiation
between pretext and mixed motives cases.' °° Instead, it treats the two cases as
though they "are separate inquiries that occur at separate stages of the
litigation."' 0 ' Under this framework, pretext analysis is a tool used to help a
plaintiff survive summary judgment.' °2 The single or mixed motives distinction
under this model is irrelevant as it relates to evidentiary availability because the
plaintiff in either case is able to use any evidence to prove that the protected trait
was a motivating factor, thus pushing the burden of proving the same decision

91. Desert Palace,268 F.3d at 889.
92. Costa v. Desert Palace,Inc., 274 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 2001).
93. Costa, 299 F.3d 838.
94. Id. at 857.
95. Id. at 851. This description of Justice O'Connor's requirement is curious in light of the fact that
she mentions "direct evidence" or "direct proof" no less than fourteen times in her opinion and
devotes considerable attention to giving a description, albeit not exhaustive, of what does not
constitute direct evidence. The Costa dissent also took issue with this characterization of Justice
O'Connor's requirement. Id. at 865 (Gould, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 851.
97. Id. at 853.
98. Id.at 851.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 857.
101. Costa, 299 F.3d at 857.
102. Id. at 854.
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defense upon the defendant. °3 This violates the guidance provided by Price
Waterhouse, as will be demonstrated below.' 4
According to Costa, a trial court, after all evidence is heard, determines what
inferences can be drawn from the evidence. 05 If the court determines that the
evidence supports only the conclusion that discriminatory intent was the only
reason for the employment decision or played no part at all in the decision, the
jury is instructed to determine whether the decision was made "because of"
gender.' °6 The jury then determines whether the employer escapes all liability or
is exposed to the full range of remedies.10 7 However, if the evidence can support
the inference that the protected trait was one of two or more reasons for the
employment decision, the jury is instructed first to determine whether the trait
was a motivating factor in the decision. 0 8 If the trait is determined to be a
motivating factor, the jury then decides whether the defendant proved that the
same decision would have been made without consideration of the trait. 0 9
In extracting the direct evidence requirement from mixed motive analysis,
the Ninth Circuit adopted an analytical model for differential treatment cases that
is relatively novel among the circuits. 10 This fresh analysis is sound, however, only
if the direct evidence requirement is not binding authority from Price
Waterhouse."'
IV.

COSTA UNDER THE SCRUTINY OF BINDING PRECEDENT

Had the direct evidence requirement been contained in a Supreme Court
majority opinion there would be little doubt of its binding nature.112 That it was
born of a concurrence by a single Justice, however, may leave some question
about whether it is binding at all. 13 Using the tools sanctioned by the Supreme
Court, an authoritative resolution points out that the4 direct evidence requirement
should be given the authority of binding precedent."

103. Id. at 853-54.
104. Infra pt. IV(B).
105. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 856.
108. Id. at 856-57.
109. Id. at 857.
110. But see Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182-83 (2nd Cir. 1992) (noting that
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement was not part of the holding of Price Waterhouse).
111. An alternative argument is that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 legislatively overruled the direct
evidence requirement. This argument is discussed supra note 70 and the accompanying text.
112. If the direct evidence requirement had been woven into a majority opinion, it is likely that
Congress would have provided more purposeful consideration of it, ultimately making a more
definitive judgment whether to retain or abolish the requirement.
113. See Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1182-83.
114. Infra pt. IV(A) & (B).
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DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
Treatment of a Plurality Case

In addition to resolving particular controversies, the Supreme Court must
guide future decisions of courts and parties by articulating statements of the law."'
However, when no single rationale is endorsed by a majority of the Court, it can
be extremely difficult to determine whether a binding legal rule is supposed to be
gleaned from the case, and if so, what that rule may be. n 6 Such decisions may
confuse lower courts and undermine the stability of the law. 1 7 Some in the legal
community seem to take offense at the notion of a plurality decision,
characterizing it as an abdication
of the Court's responsibility and a failure of the
18
Court to fulfill its obligations.!
The disfavor with which plurality decisions are received is perhaps due to the
difficult position in which it places lower courts and the public, mandated to follow
a legal rule from a Supreme Court that was unable to articulate a rule overtly
supported by a majority of Justices. Yet for a considerable number of plurality
opinions, the holding of the case is not impossible to ascertain." 9 Although not
useful in every case,' 20 the Supreme Court has articulated a rule that can help
navigate the uncertainty of plurality opinions and thereby arrive at an
authoritative rule.' 2' In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Marks v. United
States,22 and in doing so, the Court stated that "[wihen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
123
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'
1
24
This rule has come to be known as the Marks rule or the narrowest grounds test.
The methodology of the Marks rule is easily understood by operation of the
following hypothetical. Imagine that a state enacts a law mandating that police
place a newspaper notice identifying convicted sex offenders. This law applies to
all defendants convicted after date of enactment and also to offenders who have
completed their sentence, if a panel determines that the released offender poses a
significant risk to the community. In this scenario, the law is applied to a specific
offender who has completed his sentence but was found to pose a significant risk,
and he litigates to enjoin the police from enforcement of the law against him. His
115. Note, Plurality Decisions and JudicialDecisionmaking,94 Harv. L. Rev. 1127,1128 (1981).
116. See generally Linda Novak, Student Author, The PrecedentialValue of Supreme Court Plurality
Decisions,80 Colum. L. Rev. 756 (1980).
117. See Note, supra note 115, at 1129.
118. Id. at 1128. An example of the frustration aimed at decisions is found in Tyler. 958 F.2d at 1182
(expressing frustration with having to determine the ratio decindendi of Price Waterhouse); id. (citing
Note, supra n. 115, at 1128) ("Each plurality decision thus represents a failure to fulfill the Court's
obligations.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Infra nn. 121-24 and accompanying text (introducing narrowest grounds test).
120. Infra n. 141.
121. See Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
122. 430 U.S. 188.
123. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Adam S. Hochschild, Student Author, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality
Decision:Interpretationin HistoricalPerspective,4 Wash. U. J.L. & Policy 261, 279 (2000).
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case comes before the Supreme Court, and he contends that the statute violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Four Justices (A, B, C, and D) join a single opinion upholding the law
because congressional findings indicate that sex offenders are especially harmful
to society, and the law's intent is to provide community protection instead of
punishment. Justice E separately concurs, upholding the law on the grounds that

any such notices are permitted so long as they are not meant to punish. Justice F
upholds the statute only because there is a mechanism whereby only offenders
who pose a future danger fall under the requirement, thus ensuring the statute

operates to protect, not punish. Finally, the three remaining Justices (G, H, and I)
dissent because, according to their reading of the legislative history, the statute's
purpose is primarily to humiliate and exact punishment. In this hypothetical,
Justice F's rationale represents the narrowest grounds because Justice F's
rationale is "most clearly tailored to the
specific fact situation before the Court
' 25

and thus applicable to the fewest cases.'
The underlying basis of the Marks rule is that the Justices supporting the
broader rule must necessarily agree with the validity of the narrower rule.

126

Referring back to the hypothetical above, in each case where Justice F would
uphold a notice requirement, the plurality and Justice E would also uphold it. For

this reason the narrowest grounds may be said to be a rule that would garner the
support of a majority of justices, although perhaps not the broadest statement of
the rule to which some justices would join.127 Some disapprove of the Marks rule
on grounds that it is contrary to the principle of majoritarianism. 2 8 However, the
Marks rule preserves the integrity of majoritarianism by instituting only the

rationale to which a majority of justices would agree. 29

125. Novak, supra n. 116, at 763.
126. Ken Kimura, Student Author, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretationof Plurality Decisions,
77 Cornell L.Rev. 1593, 1603 (1992).
127. An alternate way of viewing the Marks rule is to shift it into the context of a false plurality. A
false plurality is one in which a majority endorses a single rationale that supports the basis of the
holding; however, some justices continue to avow additional ideas. See Note, supra n. 115, at 1130-31.
Using the Marks rule, the narrowest grounds may be viewed as the rationale to which a majority would
agree that is sufficient to support the holding. The other opinions concurring in the result are then
viewed as additional statements that go beyond that necessary to support the holding.
128. Kimura, supra n. 126, at 1604.
129. Mr. Kimura asserts that the Marks rule is antimajoritarian and applies what appears to be
imperfect logic to prove this point. Id. Although he acknowledges that the Justices supporting the
broader rule (what I will call the plurality) would necessarily support the outcome obtained via the
narrowest grounds, he contends that the narrowest grounds impermissibly sets up a "one-way flow of
legitimacy." Id. The argument seems to be that where the plurality supports a decision based on the
presence of A and the narrowest grounds concurrence is based on the presence of both A and B, the
logic of the narrowest grounds seems sound. However, this argument would go, when another case
comes before the Court with only A, "no basis exists for believing that the Justice supporting the
broader rule will still accept the principles underlying the narrower rule." Id. This, however, does not
warrant the label of antimajoritarian. The argument ignores the existence of the other, previously
dissenting, Justices. Assuming a Court of static individual jurisprudence, the subsequent case would
not be supported because the previously dissenting justices would continue to dissent and the justice
previously concurring on narrowest grounds would not support upholding the case because B is not
present. Therefore, this coalition would be turned into a majority (or perhaps a plurality with a
concurrence).
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Some criticism of the Marks rule has focused on difficulties related to its
operation or its inapplicability to some types of plurality decisions."3 For some
cases the narrowest grounds are difficult to determine, if they exist at all."' Such
was the case in Baldasar v. Illinois.132 The Court addressed the question of
whether use of an uncounseled prior conviction to enhance punishment for a
subsequent conviction violated the Sixth Amendment. 33 A clear majority opinion
did not emerge from the Court. Instead the Justices splintered into four separate
opinions from which a clear rationale was not readily discerned. 114 Left to
determine what Baldasararticulated as a rule, lower courts applied the Marks rule
to inconsistent results. 35 Some courts determined that there were no "narrowest

grounds,1 36 while others identified Justice Blackmun's rationale as the narrower
37
1

ground.

The Supreme Court addressed the dilemma presented by Baldasar in
Nichols v. United States. 38 The Court recognized the difficulty and lack of

uniformity that occurred when the lower courts attempted to apply the Marks rule
39
to Baldasar.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court,
acknowledged that the Marks test "is more easily stated than applied 1 40 to
Baldasar. Ultimately, the Court recognized that the Marks rule was not to be used
as the exclusive test applied to all plurality opinions. 41
The proper treatment of a plurality opinion where no narrowest grounds can
be ascertained remains unclear; however, one principle is unambiguous: where the
narrowest grounds can be gleaned from a plurality opinion, the Marks rule
remains the only guidance supplied by the Supreme Court for interpretation of

130. See e.g. Novak, supra n. 116, at 763; id. at 767.
131. See Hochschild, supra n. 124, at 280-82.
132. 446 U.S. 222 (1980). See Hochschild, supra n. 124, at 280-81.
133. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 222-24 (per curiam).
134. See Hochschild, supra n. 124, at 280 n. 133. The Supreme Court splintered into a confusing
array of three concurring opinions to which a total of five justices subscribed and a dissenting opinion
shared by the four remaining Justices. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, in a
brief opinion stated that the use of a prior conviction for which defendant did not have counsel was not
valid to be used to enhance a subsequent conviction and increase the incarceration period sentenced.
Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined also by Justices Brennan
and Stevens, noted that the prior uncounseled conviction permitted the subsequent charge to be
enhanced to a felony and also concluded that the failure to provide an appointed attorney for the prior
charge made it invalid for subsequent enhancement purposes. Id. at 225-29 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Blackman, referring back to his dissenting opinion in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979),
reintroduced a bright line test mandating appointed counsel for any defendant facing more than six
months incarceration or actually imprisoned for conviction. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
135. Hochschild, supra n. 124, at 280-81.
136. See id. at 281 n. 136 (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745).
137. See id., at 281 n. 135 (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745).
138. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
139. Hochschild, supra n. 124, at 281 (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745).
140. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745.
141. See Hochschild, supra n. 124, at 281 n. 138. In Nichols, the Court noted, "We think it not useful
to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and
divided the lower courts that have considered it." Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46.
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plurality opinions. 142 The Marks rule, when used to examine Price Waterhouse,
makes the binding authority from Price Waterhouse clear.
B.

Marks Applied to Price Waterhouse

The product of the narrowest grounds rule as applied to the Price
Waterhouse opinions has only been mildly debated in lower courts and scholarly
143
writings. 4 Unlike the confusing opinions of Baldasar,applying the Marks rule to
Price Waterhouse does not result in "baffling" 144 the lower courts. That Justice
O'Connor's rationale was interpreted as the holding of Price Waterhouse soon
after it was decided supports the notion that there was little to debate.145
The Price Waterhouse opinions can be classified on "broader-narrower"
terms; therefore, it is appropriate to submit it to Marks inquiry. 146 There are two
factors to be considered in each of the Price Waterhouse opinions: the magnitude
to which the protected trait was considered and the quality of evidence used to
connect the protected trait and the employment decision. The four-Justice
plurality did not restrict the availability of the burden shift according to the degree
to which the employer considered the protected trait; rather the plurality merely
required that the plaintiff prove that the protected trait was given any
consideration at all in the context of the employment decision.147 Nor did the
plurality restrict the availability of burden shifting according to the quality of

142. Kimura, supra n. 126, at 1603.
143. Infra n. 145. The disagreement regarding the holding of Price Waterhouse has not been focused
on the product of the narrowest grounds test, but instead has been drawn on the issue of whether the
narrowest grounds test should even be applied. See e.g. Mizer, supra n. 51, at 261 (arguing that the
plain language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 abolished the direct evidence requirement). Courts
contending that the direct evidence requirement is not binding authority do not make their claim using
Marks. But see Tyler, 958 F:2d at 1182-83. The Tyler Court endorses the Marks rule; however, it then
restates it as something different: "In essence, what we must do is find common ground shared by five
or more justices." Id. This is quite different than finding the opinion which concurs on the narrowest
grounds; therefore, Tyler should not be viewed as applying the Marks rule.
144. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46 (noting that attempts to determine the narrowest grounds of
Baldasarhad "obviously baffled and divided the lower courts.").
145. Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement was quickly interpreted as the holding of the
Supreme Court in PriceWaterhouse. Even the dissenting justices treated it as such:
I read the opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by
presenting direct and substantialevidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant to show that an adverse employment decision would have been
supported by legitimate reasons. The shift in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a
plaintiff proved by direct evidence than an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually
relied upon in making the decision.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that
both the direct evidence requirement and substantialevidence requirements were contained in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, and neither was found in the plurality opinion.
Additionally, several commentators interpreted the direct evidence requirement as the holding
of Price Waterhouse shortly after it was decided. See e.g. Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, The
Reagan Court and Title VII. A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 51-53
(1990); Stuart H. Bompey, What Will Congress Do Now?: Employment Related Legislation 47 (PLI
Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B4-6956, 1991).
146. See Novak, supra n. 116, at 767.
147. Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality).
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plaintiff's evidence.148 Justice White permitted burden shifting only after the
plaintiff proved that the protected trait was a substantialfactor in the employment
decision, a slightly more stringent standard than the plurality. 149 However, Justice
White did not require this proof to be made by any particular type of evidence. 50
Justice O'Connor, like Justice White, required that the protected trait be a
substantial factor, but she also attached the additional restriction that the plaintiff
had to prove this using direct evidence. 5'
Because Justice O'Connor's rule for burden shifting in Title VII cases
requires both a showing of substantial factor and direct evidence, it is more
restrictive than both the plurality's rule (no restrictions) 52 and Justice White's rule
(substantial factor).' 53 Applying the logic of the Marks rule, the Justices of the
plurality and Justice White would necessarily concur in the result obtained each
time Justice O'Connor permits burden shifting. Therefore, according to the
Supreme Court's instructions in Marks,54 the holding of Price Waterhouse
encompasses Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement.1 55 In rejecting the
direct evidence requirement in Costa, the Ninth Circuit ignored the Price
Waterhouse holding. 6 In addition to being contrary to Supreme Court guidance,
the analytical creations of Costa jeopardize the broader condition of Title VII
litigation in a manner the Ninth Circuit refuses to acknowledge.' 57
V.

VIABILITY OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK AFTER COSTA

The Costa majority contends that even after jettisoning the direct evidence
requirement, the pretext analysis and mixed motives analysis coexist in harmony
in Title VII analysis because they are performed at different stages of the
litigation. 118 However, the dissenting judges argue that the analytical framework
adopted by the majority jeopardizes the continued existence of the pretext
framework. 5 9 This dissenting coalition is not the first to express concern that

148. Id. at 251-52.
149. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 276.
152. Price Waterhouse,490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality); id. at 251-52.
153. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
154. 430 U.S. at 993.
155. Supra text accompanying nn. 138-39. Congress, through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, replaced
the "substantial factor" requirement with the "motivating factor" test. Michael J. Zimmer, The
Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate TreatmentDiscriminationLitigation, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 563, 58586 (1996).
156. Costa, 299 F.3d at 851. Justice O'Connor may have recently hinted that she is unwavering in her
differentiation of pretext and mixed motives analysis. Writing in Reeves, Justice O'Connor noted that
the circuit court had "misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove
intentional discrimination through indirect evidence." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146. The implication
inherent in this statement is that there is a different evidentiary burden borne by the plaintiff who
seeks to prove intentional discrimination through direct evidence.
157. Infra pt. V (explaining that Costa analysis permits the destruction of pretext analysis).
158. Costa, 299 F.3d at 857.
159. The dissent cautioned:
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abolition of the direct evidence requirement would lead to the effective
destruction of the pretext analytical structure.16° The Ninth Circuit's framework
adopted in Costa threatens to effectively sound the eulogy of the McDonnell

Douglas framework by enabling practically every plaintiff who can survive
61
summary judgment to take advantage of the mixed motives jury instruction.
According to Costa analysis, when the evidence can support one of only two
possible conclusions-that discrimination was the sole reason or it played no part
at all in the adverse employment decision-the jury is instructed to determine6

whether the employment action was taken "because of" the protected trait.1 1

This means that no mixed motives instruction is given when the evidence shows
that discrimination must be either zero percent or one hundred percent of the
reason for the adverse employment decision. However, when evidence "could
support a finding that discrimination is one of two or more reasons for the
challenged decision, at least one of which may be legitimate," 163 the jury is
instructed according to the motivating factor test and same decision defense of
mixed motives analysis) 64

The fact that a single motive case 65 is a theoretical possibility seems to be
the Ninth Circuit's basis for contending that the mixed motives analysis will not
dominate Title VII litigation.1

66

While theoretically possible, when probed

further, a weakness in this claim is exposed. When would such a single motive
case arise? According to the Ninth Circuit, it would arise when the evidence could

support one of only two possible findings: (1) that discrimination is the only
reason for the employment action or (2) discrimination was not a factor in the

To keep the mixed motive framework from overriding in all cases the McDonnell Douglas
and the pretext requirement, which it clearly was not meant to do, mixed motive analysis
properly is available only in a special subset of cases. Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement meets this need ... As a practical matter, without this or some similar
constraint on when a plaintiff may invoke the mixed motives test, any plaintiff would opt for
the Hopkins framework to avoid having to show pretext.
Id. at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting).
160. Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 580 ("It is readily apparent that this mixed-motive approach, uncabined,
has the potential to swallow whole the traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis.").
161. Infra text accompanying nn. 162-69.
162. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). In this instance "the employer does not
benefit from the same decision defense." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the
employer is exposed to liability for the full range of damages and equitable relief permitted by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(t).
163. Costa, 299 F.3d at 856 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 856-57. The employer, by successfully employing the same decision defense, does not
avoid liability but instead limits the remedies available to the plaintiff to declaratory relief, injunctive
relief (excluding reinstatement, hiring, or promotion) and attorney's fees and costs. 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West 1994).
165. The case where illegal discrimination was (1) the sole reason, or (2) not a factor at all in the
adverse employment decision.
166. See Costa, 299 F.3d at 854-57. The majority's explanation of how a case may be maintained as a
single motive case appears to be the only language that even nearly approaches a refutation of the
dissent's concern that the abolition of the direct evidence requirement will also signal the effective end
of pretext analysis. The implicit statement contained in the majority's explanation is that because the
two types of cases "coexist without conflict," id. at 854, one will not significantly dominate the other.
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decision. 16 Once the employer introduces any evidence that the action was based
on some legitimate reason, assuming this evidence meets minimal requirements of
credibility such that a jury could believe it, the action becomes a mixed motives
case. 16 Theoretically, the defendant can discredit the plaintiff's evidence of
discrimination, thereby keeping the litigation in the realm of "single motive. ,169
Although it is theoretically possible to have a single motive case, it is a non
sequitur that the mixed motives analysis will not dominate Title VII litigation
under the Costa regime. While the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that a single
motive case is possible, what it does not express is the degree to which an
employer must handicap its own defense to maintain a single motive case. In any
usual case, an employer will provide a legitimate reason for the employment
decision (e.g., the person failed to meet certain criteria,7 ° was derelict,"' or was a
discipline problem172 ). However, under Costa the employer advancing such a
defense could open the door for a lower degree of scrutiny for the plaintiff's
claim."'
The effect of the Costa framework is to constrain the defendant from
presenting its most effective defense. Under Costa, a defendant accused of
discrimination cannot put before the jury perhaps its most effective evidence-a
legitimate reason for the employment decision-without invoking the
considerable disadvantages of the mixed motives framework. 74 A defense of
"discrimination is not the reason plaintiff was demoted," is likely to be much less
persuasive to a jury than a defense of "discrimination is not the reason plaintiff
was demoted; excessive absences and insubordination are the true reasons." For
this reason, the concern that Costa would effectively lead to the death of pretext
analysis is a credible one.

167. Id. at 856.
168. See generally id. at 856-57.
169. For instance, examine the hypothetical case filed by a female worker contending that she was
passed over for promotion "because of" her gender. She may present evidence that co-workers who
were not involved in the promotion decision often made sexist remarks and predicted that she would
not be promoted because the company would not fill that position with a woman. To keep this
litigation in the realm of single motives, the defendant could refute the evidence that these statements
were made by co-workers.
170. See e.g. Bickerstaff,196 F.3d at 442-44.
171. See e.g. Plair,105 F.3d at 346.
172. See e.g. Costa, 299 F.3d at 846.
173. By articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision (as is done in the
second stage of the pretext analysis), the defendant can make it possible for the jury to find that the
protected trait was one of at least two reasons for the employment decision, thus triggering the mixed
motives instruction under Costa. See id.
174. Exactly what is sufficient to permit the conclusion that mixed motives are at issue is debatable;
however, it seems that rather basic questioning of the plaintiff would open the mixed motives door. It
is conceivable that simple cross-examination of the plaintiff may open the door. "You contend that the
company fired you because you are Canadian. Isn't it true that you were at least one hour late to work
every day for three weeks?"
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IMPROVING UPON DIRECT EVIDENCE

There can be little doubt that the direct evidence requirement has led to
some bewilderment among the lower courts and a lack of uniformity even within
single circuits.'75 The development of Title VII litigation should ensure that it

properly balances the social goal of deterring discrimination and the need to
preserve an employer's prerogatives. This effort would best be served by focusing

not on abolishing the direct evidence requirement, but upon clarifying it.
A.

Mixed Motives, Mixed Circuits

A review of the caselaw in the circuits shows the difficulty in distilling a
definition of direct evidence in a manner consistent with Justice O'Connor's Price
116
From the attempts in the circuits, three principal
Waterhouse opinion.
77
definitions have emerged.

1. The "Classic" Position. A number of circuits have espoused what Judge
Selya has termed the "classic position.' ' 178 According to courts in this camp, the
direct evidence requirement is akin to its legal dictionary definition: that which
proves a fact at issue "without inference, presumption, or resort to other
evidence.' ' 179 This definition of direct evidence has been adopted by the Fifth
Circuit, 8 ° the Seventh Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit.!82 It is arguable that the
Eleventh Circuit's caselaw is best categorized similarly. 83 In Plairv. E.J. Brach,

175. Compare Bass v. Bd. of County Commrs., 256 F.3d 1095, 1105 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Direct
evidence of discrimination is evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact [in issue]
without inference or presumption.") (internal quotation marks omitted) with Wright v. Southland
Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) (defining direct evidence as "evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find, more probably than not, a causal link between an adverse
employment action and a protected personal characteristic.").
176. See Belton, supra n. 8, at 662 (noting vast divergence among lower courts defining direct
evidence).
177. In the First Circuit's examination of the direct evidence definition, Judge Selya named the three
definitions and provided explanation of each. Fernandes,199 F.3d at 582.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys., Inc., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Bodenheimer v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cit. 1993)) ("Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, would
prove the existence of a fact without any inferences or presumptions.") (emphasis original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
181. Plair,105 F.3d at 347 ("In this circuit, direct evidence is defined as evidence which if believed by
the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or
presumption.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Selya, in Fernandes, listed the Seventh
Circuit as subscribing to either the animus or animus plus definitions of direct evidence. 199 F.3d at
582 (citing Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1999); Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm
Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995)). However, the frequency with which the circuit quotes
Plair's definition of direct evidence makes it apparent that it is properly classified in the Classic camp.
See e.g. Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1999); Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150
F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 1998); Cowan v. Glendbrook Sec. Servs., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 443 (7th Cir. 1997).
182. Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Direct evidence is
evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.")
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
183. See Bass, 256 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Earley v. Champion Intl. Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th
Cir. 1990)) ("Direct evidence of discrimination is 'evidence which, if believed, would prove the
existence of a fact [in issue] without inference or presumption."') (brackets original). The recitation of

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss3/4

18

McKay: Mixed Motives Mix-Up: The Ninth Circuit Evades the Direct Evidenc
2003]

DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT

Inc.,a 4 the Seventh Circuit heard the case of a black employee with prior
disciplinary problems who was fired for leaving his work area without
authorization and for falsification of time records a85 The former employee was
replaced by a white employee, and the terminated employee brought a disparate
treatment suit.186 In concluding that the former employee had not produced direct
evidence of discrimination, the court noted that "direct evidence would be what
[the employer] and its employees said or did in the specific employment decision
in question: terminating [the employee]. 187
2. The "Animus Plus" Position. The animus plus position has become the
operational definition of direct evidence in the Fourth Circuit,' 88 Eighth Circuit, 89
and District of Columbia Circuit. a9° Under this designation, direct evidence is
evidence of "conduct or statements that (1) reflect directly the alleged
discriminatory animus and (2) bear squarely on the contested employment
decision."' 91 Both direct and circumstantial evidence can constitute direct evidence
under this meaning. 192 The District of Columbia Circuit, in Thomas v. National
Football League Players Association,'93 noted that direct evidence in this context
could be circumstantial evidence "so long as it establishes that discriminatory
motive played a substantial role in the employment decision."1 94
3. The "Animus" Position. Finally, the animus position is similar to the
animus plus view but does not require that the evidence bear squarely on the
employment decision. 95 Instead, the evidence is sufficiently direct if it is tied to
the discriminatory animus.' 96 The Second Circuit has endorsed this view.' 97 In
direct evidence in Bass seems to be the predominate view in the Eleventh Circuit. See e.g. Scott v.
Suncoast Bev. Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002); E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220
F.3d 1263, 1286 (11th Cir. 2000); Jones v. Bessemer CarrawayMed. Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n. 11 (11th
Cir. 1998). However, Judge Tjoflat has taken a position more consistent with animus plus. See Wright,
187 F.3d at 1298 (Treating direct evidence as "evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find, more probably than not, a causal link between an adverse employment action and a protected
personal characteristic."). It is noteworthy, though, that neither of the other two judges on the Wright
panel joined the opinion of the court. Both concurred in the judgment but expressly refused to join
Judge Tjoflat's opinion. Id. at 1036 (Cox, J., concurring); Id. (Hull, J., concurring).
184. 105 F.3d 343.
185. Id. at 344-46.
186. Id. at 346.
187. Id. at 347.
188. Taylor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
189. Thomas v. First Natl. Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[Direct evidence] is
evidence showing a specific link between the [alleged] discriminatory animus and the challenged
decision...") (second brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Thomas v. Natl. Football League Players Assn., 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[T]he
notion of 'direct' evidence.., means only that the evidence marshaled in support of the substantiality
of the discriminatory motive must actually relate to the question of discrimination in the particular
employment decision, not to the mere existence of other, potentially unrelated, forms of discrimination
in the workplace.") (emphasis in original).
191. Fernandes,199 F.3d at 582.
192. Id.
193. 131 F.3d 198.
194. Id. at 204.
195. Fernandes,199 F.3d at 582.
196. Id.
197. Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182. The Sixth Circuit may be treated as subscribing to an animus
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explaining what constitutes direct evidence, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
direct evidence in the Title VII context could be circumstantial evidence, but it
must be "tied directly to the alleged discriminatory animus."'9 8 The court
continued to explain that neither purely statistical evidence nor stray remarks in
the workplace made by persons not involved in the decisionmaking process were
direct evidence. 199 Examples of direct evidence included policy documents or
statements made by someone involved in the decisionmaking process "that reflect
a discriminatory or retaliatory animus of the type complained of in the suit." 2°°
4. Still More Confusion. As if it is not confusing enough that the circuits
significantly diverge in relation to the definition of direct evidence, closer
examination shows that the manner in which they apply the definition is cause for
further confusion.2 °1 For instance, the Fifth Circuit has been labeled as clinging
consistently to the classic position of direct evidence.20 2 However, in Brown v.
East Mississippi Electric Power Association,0 3 the Fifth Circuit seemingly applied
the animus plus definition. 2°4 Although the Court defined direct evidence as that
which needs no inference or presumption,2 5 one must make inferences to support
its conclusion. 2°6 In that case Brown, a black serviceman, contested his demotion
to line crewman following customer complaints.' °7 His former supervisor, one of a
group of three managers who authorized the demotion, was known to use a racial
epithet regularly to describe black persons in conversation with other white
persons and had addressed Brown directly by that epithet.20 8 Although it
recognized the definition of direct evidence as that which needs no inference to
prove a point, the Fifth Circuit panel concluded that the supervisor's regular use
of the epithet constituted direct evidence that race was a motivating factor in the
disciplinary action. 20' The supervisor had stated to other white workers in the
context of disciplining Brown, "I had to dust my little nigger again today, 210 and
the Court pointed to this statement as direct evidence that Brown's race had
colored1 his employment record and extended to disciplinary actions taken against
21

him.

Although the Fifth Circuit's application of the direct evidence requirement is
likely consistent with Justice O'Connor's true intent in constructing the direct
position that leans heavily toward animus plus. See Jacklyn v. Shering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales
Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1999).
198. Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Infra text accompanying nn. 202-22.
202. Fernandes,199 F.3d at 582.
203. 989 F.2d 858.
204. Infra nn. 191-94 and accompanying text.
205. Brown, 989 F.2d at 861.
206. Infra nn. 214-15 and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 859.
208. Id. at 859-60.
209. Id. at 861.
210. Id.
211. Brown, 989 F.2d at 862.
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evidence requirement,212 it is inconsistent with the classic position of defining
direct evidence.213 The facts of Brown required the court to infer from the
supervisor's statements that (a) the supervisor harbored discriminatory animus,
and (b) the animus motivated the supervisor to demote Brown in the decision that
gave rise to the litigation. 214 The Brown Court's application of the direct evidence
211
is more consistent with the animus plus position.
Just as a circuit that adopted the classic position of direct evidence can
actually apply it consistently with the animus plus position, the Fourth Circuit has
shown a circuit that adopts the animus plus position can apply it in a restrictive
manner more akin to the classic position.216 In a suit against her former employer,
Taylor, a former patrol officer for Virginia Union University, contended that she
had been denied the opportunity to attend the police academy because she is
female. 2" A lieutenant in the department testified, in the context of discussing
whether a different female officer would attend the academy, that the chief stated
he was "never going to send a female to the academy. '2 18 Sitting en banc, the
Fourth Circuit noted that the direct evidence requirement mandated a showing of
evidence that reflects both the discriminatory animus and that bears directly on
the employment decision. 21' This view is seemingly consistent with the animus
plus position. 220 However, in applying the definition of direct evidence the Court
concluded that Taylor had not produced direct evidence. 221 The Court reasoned
that she had satisfactorily shown the presence of discriminatory animus; however,
the chief's statement was made in reference to a different female officer and did
not bear squarely upon the decision not to send Taylor to the academy. 222 The
Court was apparently unwilling to permit proof that discriminatory animus
colored similar decisions for other officers to support an inference that it also
colored the decision in Taylor's case.
B.

Toward a Tenable Definition of Direct Evidence

Because Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse created
the direct evidence requirement,
it is wise to consult it in any attempt to
assemble a rational and sound definition of direct evidence. An important initial

212. Infra pt. VI(B) (discussing Justice O'Connor's meaning of direct evidence).
213. Infra n. 214.
214. Evidence that would have been "direct" by the Classic position would have been statements by
the supervisor such as "Idemoted Brown because he is black." Such statement requires no inference
or presumption to prove that racial animus motivated the employment decision.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 191-94 (discussing animus plus definition of direct evidence).
216. See e.g. Taylor, 193 F.3d 219.
217. Id. at 227.
218. Id. It is significant that the chief was authorized to select which officers attended the academy.
Id. at 225.
219. Id. at 232.
220. Supra pt. VI(A) (discussing the animus plus definition).
221. Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232.
222. Id.
223. 490 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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observation is that Justice O'Connor's understanding of direct evidence is not a
low hurdle for a plaintiff to surmount."' Comparing mixed motives analysis with
the presumption created by pretext analysis, she notes that upon "this type of

strong showing 2 5 (referring to direct evidence) a plaintiff is able to benefit from
the mixed motives burden shifting. 226 This preliminary observation tends to cast
doubt upon any view that equates direct evidence with any evidence sufficient for

a reasonable fact finder to infer intentional discrimination.2 7
It is clear that Justice O'Connor did not intend direct evidence in the Title
VII context to mirror exactly the broader evidentiary definition of direct evidence
as that which needs no inference. 2 8 In Price Waterhouse, no partner wrote on

Ann Hopkins' evaluation that she was rejected because she was a woman.
Instead, the evidence that gender was a factor in the firm's decision not to grant
her partnership status included statements that she was macho,229 that she
"overcompensated for being a woman," 30 and that she used profanity. 2 1
Additionally, the plurality labeled as the coup de grace, one partner's advice to

Hopkins that if she wished to improve her chances of making partner, she should
walk, talk and dress more femininely, "wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry. 2 32 This evidence requires inferences to conclude that Hopkins'

224. Id. at 276.
225. Id. (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. See e.g. Steven M. Tindall, Student Author, Do as She Does, Not as She Says: The Shortcomings
of Justice O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 Berkeley J.
Emp. & Lab. L. 332, 367-69 (1996). Professor Malamud has recommended a path that would arrive at
the same result through her "open-ended discrimination standard." Deborah C. Malamud, The Last
Minuet: DisparateTreatment after Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2317-18 (1995).
The Price Waterhouse dissent also perceived that the holding of the Court would not be
extended to every disparate treatment case. 490 U.S. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I read the
opinions as establishing that in a limited number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and
substantial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of persuasion...") (emphasis
added).
228. Direct evidence, long used as the antonym of circumstantial evidence, is technically defined as
evidence that proves a fact without inference or assumption. Black's Law Dictionary577 (Bryan A.
Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). Despite indications that Justice O'Connor did not intend to apply this
definition to the burden shifting requirement, several commentators who call for the abolition of the
requirement have assailed it as though the classic definition of direct evidence applied. See e.g.
Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
DiscriminationCases, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 703, 749 (1995). Professor Davis, in an attempt to expose
logical inconsistency in Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse opinion, actually establishes the point
above. The fact that the evidence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse was circumstantial yet satisfied
Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement demonstrates that Justice O'Connor intended direct
evidence in that context to mean something other than its legal dictionary definition. Of course, it is
less likely that confusion would have abounded had Justice O'Connor attached a different moniker to
her requirement, such as the "nexus requirement."
229. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality).
230. Id.
231. The Court noted that her use of profanity was objected to only because "it's a lady using foul
language." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
232 Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
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denial of partnership was because of her gender.2" Because Justice O'Connor
found this evidence to be sufficiently direct to warrant the mixed motives
analysis, 3 it follows that Justice O'Connor did not intend direct evidence in the
mixed motives analysis to mean the same as it does in broader sense. As if more
proof were needed, she stated directly that evidence requiring inferences might be
sufficient to invoke the mixed motives analysis.235
Rather than explain what direct evidence is, Justice O'Connor chose to state
what direct evidence is not.236 Excluded from her definition of direct evidence are
stray remarks in the workplace, statements by nondecisionmakers, and statements
by decisionmakers made unrelated to the decisional process itself.237 Justice
O'Connor also notes that testimony of sex stereotyping by a social psychologist is
not sufficient on its own to invoke mixed motives.23 . By implication, the converse
should be true. Statements and actions by decisionmakers made in a context
related to the decisionmaking process should suffice as direct evidence.
Justice O'Connor's opinion most strongly agrees with the animus plus
position adopted in some of the circuits. 239 By noting that statements made by
decisionmakers "unrelated to the decisional process itself '' 24° are insufficient to
invoke mixed motives, it appears that she rejects the animus position. More
convincingly, when describing the mixed motives procedure at trial, she notes the
plaintiff should construct the McDonnell Douglas pretext presumption, then
"should also present any direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the decisional
process. '241' The last four words are more than mere surplusage; rather they
support the conclusion that proof of discriminatory animus alone does not suffice
to invoke mixed motives analysis.
Using Justice O'Connor's opinion as a guide, the Supreme Court should
expressly define direct evidence as credible evidence that directly reflects a
discriminatory animus and is rationally connected to the adverse employment

233. See Davis, supra n. 228, at 749. There is no statement directly stating that a partner did not vote
for Hopkins because she is a woman. Such a statement would have been direct in the dictionary sense,
in that it does not require any inference or assumption to prove that her gender was a reason for the
decision not to make her a partner.
234. Id. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("What is required [to trigger mixed motives analysis] is
what Ann Hopkins showed here: direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative
reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.").
235. Id. at 278 ("Under my approach, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to show that an
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such that a
reasonable factfinder could draw an inference that the decision was made 'because of' the plaintiff's
protected status.") (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 277-78.
237. Id. at 277.
238. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Price Waterhouse, Dr. Fiske, a
social psychologist, testified at trial that she had discerned sex stereotyping in the evaluations
completed by the firm's partners. Id. at 255. Justice O'Connor wrote that such evidence, standing
alone, would not permit burden shifting. Id. at 277.
239. Supra pt. VI(A) (discussing the Amimus Plus definition of direct evidence).
240. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
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decision or the decisionmaking process. This definition should not differentiate
between evidence that requires inference or assumption and that which does not.
The requirement that the evidence show a nexus between the animus and
the decisionmaking process should incorporate some reasonable temporal
relationship.2 2 For instance, in Taylor, the Fourth Circuit held that Taylor failed
to show the sufficient nexus between animus and the employment decision when
the chief stated, in reference to another female officer, that he would never send a
female to the academy. 243 The facts in Taylor do not make it clear when this
statement was made; however, the fact that the other officer, in reference to whom
this statement was made, brought suit as a plaintiff along with Taylor suggests that
it was made as approximately the same time as Taylor's term of employment. 244 If
that is true, it demonstrates that at the time the chief would have decided whether
to send Taylor to the academy he was impermissibly denying the opportunity to
other employees based on gender. Such evidence should be sufficient to trigger
mixed motives analysis.
On the other hand, there are valid reasons not to permit mixed motives
analysis where the evidence of animus tied to employment decisions lies in the
distant past in relation to the decision at issue. For example, suppose the chief in
Taylor had been serving in that capacity for twenty-five years. Evidence that he
made the statement two decades ago about the decisionmaking process should not
alone be sufficient to show that the animus impacted the employment decision at
issue.

245

This proposed definition of direct evidence best balances the goals of the

Civil Rights Act of 196446 by setting up a process for penalizing illegal
242. What is envisioned is a test that could be satisfied through one of two pathways. Showing a
nexus between the animus and the employment decision at issue is the preferable path. However, if
the plaintiff is unable to tie it to the particular decision at issue, the plaintiff may still invoke mixed
motives if there is production of sufficient evidence that ties the animus to the decisionmaking process
in such a way that it can be said to reasonably related to the employment decision at issue.
243. Taylor, 193 F.3d at 232.
244. Keisha Johnson was also a plaintiff (with Taylor) in the suit against Virginia Union University.
The chief's statement that he would not send a female to the academy was made in reference to
Johnson. Id. at 232.
245. Whether or how a bright line test for a temporal relationship should be constructed is seemingly
difficult to determine and beyond the scope of this note. I propose for consideration a method that
would permit a hearing outside the presence of the jury. A hearing would be conducted when the
defendant reasonably contends that the proof of the nexus between animus and the decisionmaking
process precedes the employment decision at issue too remotely to be considered temporally related.
The plaintiff would produce the evidence of the nexus, then the defendant would be permitted to show
curative steps or other changes since that time which would effectively break the connection between
the animus-process nexus and the decision at issue. For example, suppose a plaintiff contended that
she was denied a promotion in 2001 because of her Islamic religious beliefs. The plaintiff
demonstrated that in 1991, the director over the plaintiff's work unit, who made the promotion
decision in 2001, stated to a supervisor, "There's no way I would promote someone who worships
Allah to a supervisory position." After this showing, the defendant would be granted an opportunity
to demonstrate that subsequent to this statement, the company implemented diversity programs, that
the supervisor at issue promoted Islamic employees to supervisory positions, or that the company took
other actions adequate to make the connection between the statement in 1991 and the employment
decision in 2001 too tenuous to be considered direct evidence. Whether the evidence is sufficiently
connected to the decision at issue would be determined by the trial court.
246. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss3/4

24

2003]

McKay: Mixed Motives Mix-Up: The Ninth Circuit Evades the Direct Evidenc
DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT

discrimination in the workplace without infringing upon employers' discretion
related to legitimate employment factors. 24 ' The Price Waterhouse plurality noted
that Title VII created a balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives and that "Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among
employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice. ' 48 While
ample attention has properly focused on the need of Title VII to weed out illegal
discrimination in the workplace, 249 courts attain a worthy goal by ensuring that
Title VII litigation does not become so undemanding of plaintiffs' claims that the
legislation meant to promote equality in the workplace becomes a mill for
frivolous lawsuits and extortionist settlement tactics.2 A procedure that does not
sufficiently hold a plaintiff to the burden of proof may foster a dramatic increase
2511
Justice O'Connor
in litigation and drive up the cost of business for employers.
even implies that a low threshold for burden shifting in Title VII cases may
promote the implementation of quotas in the workplace. 52
This suggested definition of direct evidence also preserves Justice
O'Connor's view that the mixed motives analysis should be invoked only upon a
strong showing by the plaintiff.253 Although some observers have criticized a
rigorous direct evidence requirement as a penalty against those plaintiffs who
247. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (plurality).
24& Id.
249. See e.g. Zubrensky supra n. 9, at 983-84.
250. It is logical to believe that a system that tolerates suits with questionable merits is one that
promotes them.
251. Joseph J. Ward, Student Author, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice
O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Claims, 61
Alb. L. Rev. 627, 658-59 (1997). Some authors only superficially acknowledge the potential threat to
legitimate employer interests. See e.g. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States:
The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 65, 85 (2000). Professor Summers notes
that antidiscrimination laws "limit employer prerogatives only to the extent of requiring that all
employees be treated equally." Id. Although this may be considered truth, it glosses over the
significant burden that would be placed upon employers if the mixed motives analysis is available to
practically all Title VII plaintiffs. Employers may find themselves having to prove their innocence
after a very weak evidentiary showing by the plaintiff. The retort to this contention is that the
employer is protected by the initial requirement that plaintiff prove the protected trait was more likely
than not a factor in the employment decision. However, this provides little protection to an innocent
employer, as individuals in the nation seem more polarized than ever, especially on issues related to
race and gender. See generally Sharon Linstedt, Survey Finds Glaring Divide in Workplace
Discrimination, Buffalo News Cl (Feb. 18, 2002) (referencing a study that notes sharp contrast in
perceptions of employment discrimination among blacks and whites). For many jurors racial or gender
discrimination is likely the simplest answer applied in a sort of Ockham's Razor to the question, "Why
did the employer make this adverse employment decision in relation to this plaintiff?" Johnny
Cochran's conclusion that black NFL coaches are held to a higher standard than white coaches may be
just one example of a unidimensional examination being heralded as conclusive "proof" of
discrimination. See generally Bob Cohn, Higher Standard?; The Facts Don't Fit in Report on NFL
Hiring, Wash. Times C01 (Oct. 8, 2002).
252. Justice O'Connor noted:
[S]hifting the burden of persuasion to the employer in a situation like this one [where direct
evidence is produced] creates no incentive to preferential treatment in violation of § 2000e2(j). To avoid bearing the burden of justifying its decision, the employer need not seek
racial or sexual balance in its work force; rather, all it need do is avoid substantial reliance
on forbidden criteria in making its employment decision.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 275 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 276.
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cannot satisfy it,254 the plaintiff who does not have sufficient evidence to invoke
mixed motives analysis may still rely upon the McDonnell Douglas framework.2 5
This framework has been sufficient for many plaintiffs, 256 and simply requiring a
plaintiff to make a strong showing to obtain the most favorable analytical process
should not be viewed as a penalty. That the plaintiff must carry the burden of
proving the claim is a bedrock principle of tort law in the American legal
system. 257 Courts should not permit the stigmatizing labels that accompany a
finding of discrimination to be affixed to defendants without considerable proof
258
that there was actually discrimination that gave rise to adverse consequences.

VII. CONCLUSION

Although the Ninth Circuit erroneously treated the direct evidence

requirement as irrelevant in the analysis of Title VII litigation, 259 the requirement
is part of the binding precedent of Price Waterhouse.260

There is no clear

indication that Congress intended to alter the requirement in its enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.261
The direct evidence requirement has led to divergent definitions and even

more conflicting treatments among the lower courts.262 To allay confusion and
promote proper analysis of litigation, courts should adopt a definition of direct
evidence that focuses on proof of discriminatory animus that is tied to the adverse
employment decision. Such a definition would best foster the goals of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 while preventing the threat of questionable litigation from

holding employers hostage.
Brian W. McKay

254. See generally Tindall, supra n. 227, at 336.
255. Ward, supra n. 251, at 658.
256. Id. at 660-61.
257. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(1) (1965).
258. Cf. Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 487 n. 14 (Conn. 1991) (citing Riley Hill Gen.
Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595, 605 (Or. 1987) and noting that one rationale for
requiring a higher standard of plaintiffs proving fraud is that a finding of fraud imposes a "stigma of
guilt" on the defendant). Because the "discriminator" label carries a similarly strong stigma, allowing
plaintiffs to make viable legal claims of discrimination upon feeble evidentiary showings grossly
inflates the settlement bargaining power for plaintiffs, as they can demand large sums from employers
who wish to avoid a harmful public accusation of discrimination. For discussion of these issues, see
generally Karen Jacobs, More Companies Seek Diversity as Internal Bias Suits Increase, Houston
Chron. 2 (Feb. 10, 2002) and Amy Martinez, Fighting Discrimination with What Business Fears: BigDollar Lawsuits, Palm Beach Post 1A (March 4, 2001) (noting a plaintiffs' lawyer's use of marketing
firms to draw publicity for discrimination suits and commenting that employers accused of
discrimination by the lawyer profiled should "avoid a protracted, expensive and image-damaging trial and pay up.").
259. Costa, 299 F.3d 838.
260. Supra pt. IV(B) (establishing that the direct evidence requirement is the narrowest grounds
contained in the Price Waterhouse plurality and concurrences).
261. See Mizer, supra n. 51, at 257 ("[Clombing the legislative history to discern Congress' intent
regarding direct evidence becomes largely a task of inference from silence.").
262. See Belton, supra n. 8, at 662-63.
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